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TORTS
WIRT PETERS*

This memorandum continues the survey of tort cases begun initially
by Anderson and Smith' and follows, generally, their outline. Our delineation specifically eliminates any consideration of the cases on Workmen's
Compensation; avoids those on damages; and allows only an incidental
glimpse of procedure. Nevertheless, the necessity to review the interpretation, application, and enforcement of tort principles required the Supreme
Court of Florida to write opinions in some two hundred cases2 in the brief
period since the prior survey. Even so, one is hard pressed to find much
that is important, not to say new, and it is not intended here simply to
count cases in which the Court has been compelled to repeat, almost
monotonously, basic and well established principles. Only a few citations
are needed to serve as memory refreshers. Further, most of the cases in
which the Court had to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence justifiably
can be ignored.
TIlE INTENTIONAL TORTS

With the daily newspapers continually filled with stories of violent
crimes, and lesser unlawful physical activities, it is nothing less than
amazing that there have been no cases involving the physical contact torts,
and very few cases involving any of the other intentional torts, to reach
the Supreme Court.
False Arrest and False Imprisonment
The significant development was not provided by the Court but by
the Florida Legislature. Throughout the long, everlasting search for, and
continual testing of, equitable and yet practicable rules of conduct, the
trend of philosophical advancement has required the progression to be
from rigid to flexible; from rules that needed no interpretation to rules
which require considerable interpretation plus enlightened application
and enforcement. "Thou shall not ....

"I'

was direct, straightforward, and

unequivocable. While, on the other hand, the later rule that has been
called "Golden'"' is subject to varying individual interpretation. The simple
language of the rule is an affirmative mandate commanding positive action
by one party regardless of the interests or desires of the other party, and
without consideration of any of the various rights with which the common
law endows him. At this point the objection usually begins, "But the
*Professor of Law and Director, Tax Program, University of Miami.
1. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 477 (1954).
2. The cases surveyed are reported in Volumes 68 through 79 of the Southern
Reporter, Second Series.

3. Exodus XX.
4. St. Matthews VII, 12.
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rule means .

. .

."

thereby proving the only proposition advanced here:

interpretation is required.
The Florida Legislature had this problem, among others, before it
while considering a change in the policy relating to false arrest and false
imprisonment, and decided to add an additional complicating factor. The
Statute5 as now enacted provides that merchants and their employees may
take into custody, and reasonably detain, without incurring any civil or
criminal liability, persons whom they have probable cause to believe have
unlawfully taken goods offered for sale. Of course, probable cause is not a
new concept, and courts and juries have often had to interpret facts and
circumstances in order to determine whether, in their opinion if not in
others', probable cause existed. But this legislative action is a step in the
direction of flexibility and more uncertainty for the members of the
general public.
Admitting that merchants are plagued by shoplifters, and that that
kind of thievery is a serious problem involving considerable loss, how far
should merchants be permitted, in order to prevent a theft, to invade the
rights of those they invite into their stores to inspect, examine, test, use,
and develop a possessory interest in their property? If, as the invitee leaves
he feels a hand, inevitably heavy, on his shoulder and hears the dreaded
"You are under arrest!" with all the attendant embarrassment, inconvenience,
and consequent invasion of privacy; and, if it should be determined that
nothing had been unlawfully taken, is the whole incident to be minimized
and terminated with the charming generality that "I had probable cause"?
Perhaps, as a practical matter, the merchants are not likely to change
their methods in view of this liberalization of their right to arrest, nor is
the public likely to realize there has been a change in the law which,
theoretically, requires a more careful appearance of detachment in their
individual conduct. When everything is fine, friendly, and frictionless
there is hardly any need for stated principles, but when relationships are
difficult the rules should be clear and permit as little difference of opinion
as possible. Principles should not be easily changed to accommodate
particular interests.
Laymen, and some uneducated lawyers, have frequently criticized the
common law as being protective of property as opposed to individual rights,
it apparently being difficult for them to understand the concept that it is
the right of the individual, even though a property owner, and not the
object itself which is given the protection of the law. The Legislature
balanced this right against the rights of the invitees, and legislated in
favor of the rights of the owner of the property.

5. Laws of Fla., c. 29668 (1955).
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Defamation
There is one case which has evoked such widespread interest and
comment that it can not be passed without notice here. "Don't let that
man speak. I know him and lie is communist." That statement at a public
meeting before fifteen hundred persons formed the basis of a complaint
which the Court found stated a cause of action, explaining:
To charge that one is a member of the Communist Party which
has as its object the overthrow of the Government of the United
States and of Florida by force or violence and the abolishment of
free speech, free assembly and freedom of religion, which is the
compete antithesis of the American constitutional form of government, and that the methods used by such Communist Party include
treachery, deceit, infiltration into governmental and other
institutions, espionage, sabotage, and terrorism, necessarily causes
injury to the person spoken of in his social, official and business
relations of life. Such words hold him up to scorn, contempt
and ridicule, causing such person to be shunned by his neighbors,
and in effect charges such person with being a traitor to his country
and with being a member of an organization with a primary purpose
of the destruction by force or violence of the very Government
which protects him.
It is difficult for us to conceive of any words or charge which
would be more slanderous per se than the words used in this case,
at the time and place and under the circumstances set forth .... 0

Absolute privilege. The Court had occasion to extend the rule of
absolute privilege of statements made in judicial proceedings to defamatory
words published in the course of a quasi-judicial hearing before the State
Insurance Commissioner; ' and to confirm the privilege for the members
of the grand jury."
Limitations. The Court determined that the two year statute of
limitations applicable to actions for libel and slander was equally applicable
to actions for slander of title for the malicious disparagement and impairment of the vendibility of title to real property.9
NEGLIGENCE CASES

During the period since the prior survey, the tort cases involving a
consideration of negligence maintained their large numerical majority over
those of the intentional torts. Nevertheless, none can be called a landmark,
and only a few are of sufficient interest to be discussed.
Duty. "For every wrong there is a remedy, but the remedy must be
sought against the negligent party." The owner of a building is not
necessarily subjected to liability simply because the person happened to
6.
7.
8.
9.

Joopanenko v Gavagan, 67 So.2d 434 (Fa. 1953).
Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So2d 198 (Fla. 1954).
Ruon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Ind., 68 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1953).
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be in the building at the time of an injury. The Court said that the owner
of the building did not have a duty to anticipate an injury which resulted
to an invitee when a mother conveyed her child, in a stroller, down an
escalator. 10 So, too, the owner and operator of a gasoline filling station
through which many people walked for a short cut, was said to owe no
duty to an injured licensee "except not to harm him wilfully or wantonly,
or to set traps for him, or to expose him to danger recklessly or wantonly."
And, grease left carelessly on the areaway was not a violation of any daty."
Notice. "To be liable, the creator of a dangerous condition must know
about and be responsible for his creation." In a suit by a woman customer
in a super market who was injured when she slipped and fell, the trial
court erred in not charging that the defendant must have actual or constructive notice of the slippery condition to be liable.1 2
Attractive nuisance. The Florida Legislature took notice of the appalling
number of children who had been entombed in old ice boxes. Beside
making it unlawful to abandon any such containers which can not be
opened from the inside, and providing for a fine and imprisonment, the
Legislature specifically declared all such containers to be attractive nuisances
to children.' 3
Res ipsa loquitur. "Negligence will not be presumed, it must be proven,
but when direct proof is wanting and such circumstances are shown as
to leave no conclusion except that the defendant was at fault, a prima
facie case may arise justifying the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. One who proves specific negligence may not avail himself of
the doctrine."' 4 Further, in an action for damages caused by an exploding
beverage bottle, it was held incumbent on the plaintiff to show there had
been no injury to the bottle sufficient to cause the explosion from improper
or careless handling after it had left the custody of the bottler before
the doctrine of re ipsa loquitur would be applicable. 15
Contributory negligence. "It is the duty of all persons to observe ordinary
care for their own safety,"' 0 and forgetfulness of a known danger is
contributory negligence in itself, where it is not consistent with the exercise
of ordinary care. A prudent person does not proceed in the dark in an
unknown place when there is no pressing emergency to do so and when
a clear opportunity exists to return to a safe place. So, a paying guest in
a hotel who entered a dark hallway knowing of the existence of a stairway
descending from the hall, but, nevertheless, proceeded and, attempting to
10. Heps V. Burdine's, 69 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1954).
11. Bruno v. Seigel, 73 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1954).
12. Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
13, Laws of Fla., c. 29707 (1955).
14. Roth v. Dade County, 71 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1954) citing specifically as the
leading case in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was discussed at length and
the circumstances tinder which it will be applied defined, \West Coast Ilospital Ass'n
v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951).
15. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reisinger, 68 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1953).
16. Brant v. VanZandt, 77 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1955).
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find the light switch, plunged down the stairway, was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. 17
Automobiles
Such a high percentage of the cases reviewed for this survey involve
parties who were using automobiles so as to attract particular notice.
Apparently, the automobile is here to stay, and, just as obviously, we
have not yet learned to adequately cope with it. Never before in history
has the public been so deluged with signs, warnings, and threats relating
to a limited number of laws and regulations; never before has there been
such a tremendous enforcement effort; and, probably, never before has
there been such universal violation.
Judicial notice. The Court had occasion to say that "it is common
knowledge that motorists now traverse the highways all times of the day
and night," and that even in rural areas freight trains are not expected to
block the highway at two o'clock in the morning unprotected by adequate
warning lights.' 8
Negligence. It is possible that a driver may be guilty of gross negligence
if he insists on driving while he is ill or weak, depending upon the degree
of illness, or if he has a premonition of a stroke. However, in the
particular case before the Court the complaint was held insufficient.
Negligence will not generally be imputed to one who suddenly suffers an
attack or stroke, which results in loss of consciousness, and causes an
injury."'
Rules. Proximate cause, assumption of risk, res ipsa loquitur, last clear
chance, sudden emergency, and contributory negligence were all brought
into the Court under various circumstances and with varying results, but
none of the cases were outstanding. For example, the Court had occasion
to say that the last clear chance doctrine is founded upon the actual or
implied knowledge of the defendant, when he attempts to set up the
negligent conduct of the plaintiff as a bar under a plea of contributory
negligence. No liability is predicable when the injured person's knowledge,
actual or implied, of the danger causing the injury either surpassed or
even equaled that of the defendant when the peril arose, as a pedestrian
crossing a busy boulevard at night.20 Nor can one depend upon the theory
of sudden emergency when his own negligent running of a red stop light
brings such emergency into existence.21
Vicarious liability. The Court reaffirmed the absolute responsibility of
the owner of an automobile for the negligence of those who operate it
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Ibid.
Atlantic C. L. Ry. v. Johnston, 74 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1954).
Baker v. Hausman, 68 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1953).
Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
Seitner v. Clevenger, 68 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1953).
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under his license, with his express or implied knowledge and consent.
Such owner will not be permitted to refute the relationship, implied in
law, which makes him liable. A study of the origin and application of
the doctrine of vicarious liability shows that it is based squarely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior and arises from a principal and agent
relationship implied in law. As far as the use of automobiles is concerned,
the doctrine is not limited to situations where the strict relationship
of master and servant exists, but the owner always stands in the relation
of superior to those whom he voluntarily permits to use his car. Under this
strict doctrine, a passenger in the car, who was injured because of the
negligence of the driver who had borrowed the car for a purely personal
purpose, could recover from the owner even though the passenger could not
recover from the driver because of the marital relationship existing between
22
them.
This doctrine of respondeat superiorextends entirely through a bailment
for hire where the contract does not contain any restrictions on loaning
the car, so that there is an implied consent for an acquaintance of the bailee
to use it. The owner was, therefore, liable for the injury to a pedestrian
struck by the car while being driven by the acquaintance of the bailee.23
On the other hand, in another suit based on these same facts, the Court
held that proof of actual ownership of the car causing the injury is not
indispensable to recovery, saying that, "the misfortune of the injured
person should not depend entirely upon the repository of the legal title;
nor is recovery dependent upon perfection of title in a given person."
Accordingly, a bailee has sufficient title to be responsible for injuries
caused by the one to whom he entrusted the car. 24
PROCEDURE

Although the procedural problems are generally without the scope of
this memorandum, the mentioning of a few points, if only briefly, is
irresistible.
Service of Process upon Minors. In a tort action for injuries caused by a
minor,2 the parents being joined, service of process was secured by serving
the infant's mother as guardian and the person in whose care and custody
the minor was at the time of the service of process. The Court held that
this was insufficient to give jurisdiction of the minor as not being in full
compliance with the requirements of the Florida Statute which provides
in part:
The courts of this states shall obtain jurisdiction of minors . . .
by further serving the writ or summons upon the guardian ad litem
22.
23.
24.
25.

May v. Palm Beach Chem. Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
Fleming v. Alter, 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1954).
Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
Gissen v. Goodwill, 74 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1954).
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thereafter appointed by the court to represent said minor. (Italics
added).21

Limitations. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations attaches at once where
an injury, however slight, is sustained in consequence of the wrongful act
of another and the law affords a remedy therefor. However, where the
plaintiff received an overdose of x-ray treatment but was aware of nothing
indicating an injury, the statute of limitations did not commence to run
until the plaintiff was first put upon notice that she had sustained an
injury or had reason to believe that her right of action had accrued.";
Trial. The Court must have had difficulty repressing a smile when it
found it necessary to hold that an opening statement to the jury is no
basis on which to grant a directed verdict;28 and, of course, the Court has
repeatedly held that a summary judgment should be entered where there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact,2 9 with all doubts being resolved
against the granting of summary judgments.2 0 In a suit arising out of an
automobile accident, the defendant was not entitled to a summary judgment
where affidavits on the defendant's ownership of the car, which caused
the damage, were in conflict.3 1
Appeal. In a personal injury suit arising out of a collision between a
bicycle and a semi-trailer van, a police officer, who was not an eyewitness
to, but who investigated, the accident, testified to his conclusion as to who
did what at the scene of the accident and gave his opinion that the plaintiff
was at fault. No objection was made to the question, "Who do you believe
was at fault?", nor was any motion made to strike his answer. Again,
it is well settled that the Supreme Court may not consider any grounds
of objections to admissibility of the evidence which were not specifically
32
made in the trial court.
CoNCLUSION

Even a rapid summary survey of the cases reviewed for this memorandum compels the conclusion that the Supreme Court is required to
devote far too much of its time to cases which do not warrant consideration
by such a high tribunal. The Court is reviewing elementary procedural
problems and simple applications of legal principles to factual situations
when the rights of the parties involved in the cases could be well protected
by an intermediate appellate court. This article must conclude, as it
began, with the observation that the Court is burdened with cases in
which it is compelled to repeat, almost monotonously, the basic, well
established principles of law. It appears doubtful that the Court has
sufficient time to adequately consider the few cases which really require
mature, experienced reflection, deliberation and decision.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

§ 47.23 (1953).
Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1954).
Fields v. Quillian, 74 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1954).
Fouts v. H. F. C., 75 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1954).
Johnson v. Studstill, 71 So2d 251 (Fla. 1954).
Lineberger v. Domino Canning Co., 68 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1953).
FLA. STAT.

